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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Authority for this appeal is found within the confines
of Section 77-35-26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;
Utah State Constitution Article I, Section 12 and Section 782a-3.

TEXT OF STATUTES
United States Constitution Fourth Amendment:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.
Article I, Section 14> Utah State Constitution;
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.

IV

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
This is a criminal action wherein the defendant plead
guilty to crimes of possession of narcotics and
paraphernalia, yet reserving his right to appeal on the issue
of the denial of his motion to suppress. The defendant
sought the trial court to suppress evidence arguing that his
rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment and Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution were violated.

The

trial court denied his motion and the defendant seeks appeal.
The officers conducted a search of a particular
apartment under authority of a search warrant. The warrant
was particular as to the apartment to be searched, the
persons to be searched and the property to be searched. The
defendant was not within any of said descriptions. He was
outside the apartment repairing a truck.

The truck was

located within a common area utilized by the occupants of the
apartment as well as residents of the apartments surrounding
the common area. The officers approached the apartment and
forcibly took the defendant to the ground, detained him and
then required that he enter the apartment. He was later
searched. Were the defendant's rights to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures violated?

v
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STATBHEWT OF TEE CASE
Defendant Stacey A. Covington was charged by information
with possession of controlled substances and paraphernalia.
Defendant moved to suppress evidence uncovered during the
search of the defendant's person. The trial court denied
said motion to suppress. The defendant entered a conditional
plea reserving his rights to appeal the trial court's denial
of his motion to suppress.

STATEMENT QF FACTS
A Motion to Suppress hearing occurred before the
District Court on June 22, 1994, pursuant to defendant's
1

Motion to Suppress. T-187,L7-12. Defendant•s motion was
denied.

The defendant thereafter entered a plea of guilty

reserving this issue-

The issue is dispositive of the case.

The defendant challenged the propriety of searching the
defendant when he was outside the home to be searched and was
not named in the warrant. No authority existed under the
warrant to search him.
The State called Officer Shaun Adamson as a witness.
Mr. Adamson is a deputy for the Utah County Sheriffs
Department, assigned to work for the narcotics task force in
Utah County. Officer Adamson testified that the Utah County
Narcotic Task Force conducted a search upon the home located
at 479 South 100 East in Pleasant Grove, Utah, pursuant to a
search warrant.

T-187, L-13,17.

The narcotics task force offices were located only 200300 feet from the northeast corner of the residence. T-189,
L-35.

Pursuant to surveillance being maintained on the

residence, (T-188, L-17-22) officers knew that the defendant
did not live at the residence. T-189, L-14,15/T-191, L, 410.

Mr. Covington had not been at the home previously. T-

191, L 14-15.

During the pre-raid plan, officers became

aware that Covington was present (T-192, L 3-6)

working on a

vehicle 8-10 feet outside the residences. The truck had its
hood up. T-193, L6-12.

Covington was located between the
2

residence and the vehicle. T-193, L-19. Other apartments
were within feet of the apartment to be searched, Mr.
Covington, and the truck.

T-201 L-17-24.

Executing the warrant, the officers approached the
southeast corner of the home. Uniformed officers entered the
home first. T-194, L-l-11. The first contact was with Mr.
Covington. Officer Adamson took custody of Mr. Covington;
the other officer continued into the residence. T-194, L-1723.

Only fractions of seconds elapsed between the time the

initial officers approached Mr. Covington, and Adamson took
him into custody. T-195, L-l-2. Covington was taken into
custody; he was forced to the ground as the officers
proceeded into the apartment. T-195, L-8-10.

Covington was

laid on the ground spread eagle near the front end of the
truck. T-196, L-5-10.

T-196, L-13. Other support units

arrived and entered into the apartment; the apartment was
secured.

T-196, L16-17. Mr. Covington was frisked while on

the ground.

T-196, L-20-22.

During the frisking of Mr. Covington, Adamson believed
that he felt a hard object, cylinder in shape in Mr.
Covington's shirt pocket. Adamson knew it was not a weapon.
T-204 L-22-23.

T-196, L- 25. He also felt a cigarette

package in the same pocket. T-197, L-3-5. The hard object

3

was cylinder in shape; like a spark plug, but smaller in
nature. T-197, L8-12.
No further search occurred of Covington outside.

It was

only after Mr. Covington was taken inside the residence, down
into the living room and was placed there with the
apartment's residents that a search occurred.

T-198, L-23--

T-199, L-3. Then the hard object was removed along with the
cigarette package.

Inside the cigarette package marijuana

was discovered. The hard object was a marijuana pipe. T-199,
L 9-12.
Officer Adamson was aware that the search warrant
authorized the search of the downstairs apartment and all
individuals present at 47 9 South 100 East, Pleasant Grove,
Utah. He was aware that the search warrant directed a search
of Rick Close, John Walker, Melissa Seamster, and narcotics
or other evidence of trafficking.

T-200, L-l-14. Officer

Adamson knew, in fact, that Mr. Covington was not John
Walker, Rick Close, or Melissa Seamster. T-200, L-19-25.
Officer Adamson knew that Mr. Covington was at least 8-10
feet outside the residence. T-201, L- 2-4. Adamson also
recognized that the search warrant authorized only a search
of the downstairs apartment. T-201, L-7-9. T-201, L-14-16.
Adamson recognized that the area in which Mr. Covington was
located was common ground to both apartments or units. The
4

apartment was one of two within the same building. Other
apartments and residences were also located around this
common area. T-201, L-17-24.
Officers had no concern that Covington threatened their
safety. Mr. Covington was observed to have no weapons upon
his person. T-201, L-8-10. Mr. Covington was wearing a Tshirt# plaid flannel shirt with long sleeves open in front,
Levi's and tennis shoes. T-202, L-12-14. No guns, knives,
or any other weapons were visible upon Mr. Covington as
officers approached.

T-202, L-15-17. During the pat down

search of Mr. Covington, Adamson did not sense that there
were any weapons upon Mr. Covington. T-202, L-20-22.
Adamson felt that Mr. Covington posed no danger to himself or
the other officers as he was placed on the ground. T-202, L23--T-203, L-6.
Covington, after the pat down search outside, was
handcuffed and taken into the basement apartment.
9-11.

T-203, L-

No resistance was given by Mr. Covington. He complied

with all of the officer's requests or orders. T-203, L-14.
Mr. Covington never attempted to alarm the other occupants of
the basement.

T-203, L-15-17. Covington did not have

sufficient time to warn the occupants of the apartment. As
the officers approached Covington, they were simultaneously

5

entering the apartment. T-203, L-20-24.

T-203, L-25--T-

204, L-3.
There was a total of approximately 7-8 officers
conducting the search.

T-212, L-22-23.

They all entered the

house basically at the same time. T-212, L-24/T-213, L-l.
After Covington was taken downstairs and searched, he was
arrested on the marijuana charge and transported to the
Pleasant Grove Police Department. T-217 L- 24/T-218. In the
process of booking, a small additional quantity of
methamphetamine was found on his person. They located the
methamphetamine in the change pocket of his Levi pants. T17, L-l-13.
STOttAEY OF THE ARGUMENT
The protection granted by the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article l, Section 14 of the
Utah State Constitution which is often not grasped by zealous
officers, does not deny law enforcement the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence.
Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime. When officers exceed the
authority of a search warrant, it must be under only the most
exigent circumstances. Here, the officer's safety was not
6

endangered nor was there any reasonable articuable suspicion
that Covington was involved in criminal activity.
hMSQMSST.

MEMORANDUM OF IAW
The Fourth Amendment confines an officer executing
a search warrant strictly within the bounds set out by the
warrant. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. 403 U.S. 388,
394 (1971); Standord v. Texas. 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965);
Marrnn v. U.S. 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).

Particularity is

demanded by the Fourth Amendment, and not read with poetic
license. Commonwealth v. Hall. 366 Mass. 790, 323 N.E.2d 319,
325 (1975); U.S. v. Medina. 842 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir. 1988).
Once legally on the premises, lawful searches of fixed
premises generally extend to the entire area in which
contraband could reasonably be found.

Containers may be

searched, (United States v. Gray. 814 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir.
1987); State v. Hansen. 732 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1987); S_£a£e.
v. Jackson. 237 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (April 19, 1994)), however,
a distinction is made between visitors to the home and
containers. Visitors cannot be searched. Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692,(1981); Maryland v. Buie. 494 U.S. 325
(1990); State V. JacKson, 237 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (April 19,
1994) .

7

SEARCHES OF PERSONS PRESENT
A distinction must be drawn between the home's residents
and visitors. An individual's
in a search

warrant

mere presence

at a place

named

does not automatically subject the

individual to a personal search.

United states v. Pi Re. 332

U.S. 581, 587, 68 S.Ct. 222, 225 (1948); Ybarra v. Illinois.
444 U.S. 90, 92 (1979).

Searches of items known to belong to

visitors rather than to residents of the premises may result
in personal searches, outside the scope of the premises
search warrant. United States v. Giwa, 831 F.2d 538, 544
(5th Cir. 1987).
in Michigan vt Summers/ the U.S. Supreme court
legitimized the detention of the "occupant" of the searched
premises. However, in Ybarra Vt Illinois, 444 U.S. 90, 92
(197 9), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the search of
a bar patron -- and the concomitant search and seizure of the
property in his pocket - - where the search was based entirely
on the mere fact of his presence at the bar.

In Ybarra. the

police executing a search warrant for a public tavern
detained and searched all the customers who happened to be
present.
The upshot of Summers and Ybarra is that the police may
briefly detain -- but not search -- the occupants of searched
premises based entirely on their presence at the scene.
8

This is further verified by the holdings in

State v.

Jackson. 87 3 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1994) wherein the Appellate
Court held that it may be okay to search a visitor's purse
(depending on its location) but not the visitor.
OCCUPANT OR NON- OCCUPANT
The Michigan v. Summers Court did not define what
"occupant" meant. The Court did, however, make clear that it
found it significant the fact that the executing officers
knew that the individual detained 'lived in the house.' Id.
at 692 n. 4 which draws into question -- what about a nonoccupant located outside the home?
Lower courts have interpreted the "occupant" requirement
broadly, not requiring ownership of the premises before
detention is permissible (U.S. v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 7 01, 7 07
(9th Cir. 1983)), but narrowly enough so as to preclude the
detention of known non-occupants, i.e., visitors or guests,
who are merely found to be present at the scene, state v.
Carrasco. 711 P.2d 1231, 1233-34 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).

Covington obviously is a non-occupant found outside the
apartment•
In Carrasco. the Court found that although the
defendant had walked into the apartment without knocking, his
conduct was otherwise not consistent with that of an
'occupier' of the place and a search was impermissible.
9

Also, Martin v. State. 761 S.W.2d 26, 29 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988); Lippert v. State, 664 S.W.2d 712, 720-721 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1984); State v. Braodhax, 754 P.2d 96, 103-104 (Wash.

1982) . Searches are unlawful of persons who knocked on the
door of a searched premises. U.S. v. clay, 640 F.2d 157 (8th
Cir. 1981).

Knight v. State, 566 So.2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1990).

At any particular time, even a private residence

may have on its premises any combination of residents,
invitees, licensees, or even trespassers; any number of these
occupants may be innocent of any alleged wrongdoing for which
probable cause to search exists. Aguilar v. state, 594 A.2d
1167 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).

Searches of persons leaving

a premises as executing officers arrived was not justified.
State v. Simien, 590 So.2d 603 (La. Ct. App 1992);

A search

of a person who entered and departed a search premises while
officers were waiting for a warrant to arrive was
unjustified.
App. 1992).

People v. Coscarelli. 493 N.W.2d 525 (Mich. Ct.
A search of an occupant was not justified by his

mere presence at a drug sale. Rivera v. U.S.. 928 F.2d 592
(2nd Cir. 1991).

The assumption that anyone on the premises

could be involved in drug trafficking would not be sufficient
to justify full scale searches of those present. A person
may visit a suspected premises for valid reasons. Bell v.
State, 845 S.W.2d 4545 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984).
10

Searches of

guests are impermissible.
(111. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).

People v. Simmons. 569 N.E.2d 591
Even a search of the owner and

occupant of a searched premises has been held not permissible
by the mere mention of his name in the search warrant as the

owner. commonwealth v. Eicfcelfrerger, 508 A.2d 589 (Pa. sup.
Ct. 1986).
Other courts have found that even though a purse or
container of a visitor may be searched dependent upon the
particular circumstances, the person may not be searched.
United States v. Teller. 397 F.2d 494 (7th Cir.) cert,
denied, 393 U.S. 937, 89 S.Ct. 299 (1968); U.S. v. Johnson.
475 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Riccitelli.
259 F.Supp. 665, 666 (D. Conn. 1966); Carman v. State. 602
P.2d 1255, 1262 (Alaska 1979).
In State v. Jackson, the Court authorized a search of a
purse but not the visitor. The purse was lying on a kitchen
counter and the defendant was standing in the kitchen. Upon
searching the purse, the officer saw a plastic bag containing
marijuana and then found items identifying the defendant as
the purse owner. The search of the visitor is impermissible.
See also United States v. Brandt. 545 F.2d 177, 182 (D.C.
Cir. 197 6), wherein the Court found that neither the
defendant nor his bag, being a mere visitor, were subject to
search.
11

One must also look to Illinois v. Ybarra. wherein the
search of patrons of a bar were not specified in the warrant
and thereby not subject to search. The Supreme Court struck
down the search of the bar's patrons although the bar may
have been searched.

In State of Utah v. Steward. 806 P.2d

213 (Utah App. 1991), the Court found the mere presence of
the defendant in the area where the officers are to search,
or even the appearance of what appears to be suspicious
behavior, does not justify a detention. The officers must
have such reasonable cause to believe that criminal activity
is afoot. See also Brown v. Texas. 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct.
2637, 61 L.Ed. 357 (1979).

CONCISION
The protection granted by the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah State Constitution which is often not grasped by zealous
officers, does not deny law enforcement of the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence.
Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate, not to be judged
by officers engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime. Once a warrant has been issued, it is a
stamp of judicial approval granting to the police definite
instructions defining what and who is to be searched.
12

The

officers have no authority to exceed the warrant's direction
excepting exceptional circumstances. The Warrant Clause
places a line at the point where the property or persons to
be searched come under the exclusive dominion of police
authority.
Here, the magistrate found probable cause to search the
apartment and particular people therein-

The search of the

defendant was not authorized by the warrant and he should
have been free from such a search. He was repairing a truck.
He posed no danger to the officers. He posed no danger as to
the success or failure of the apartment's search. He
exhibited no articuable reason to suspect that he was
involved in any crime. He was in a common area shared by
multiple apartments and residences. He had not been observed
as an occupant or a visitor to the apartment to be searched.
There is no reason to believe that he was involved with this
apartment or with its occupants.
Even a visitor inside the apartment is free from search
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State
Constitution. However, the officers conducted a search of
the defendant finding him outside.
Mr. Covington should have been free from police
intervention, therefore, any evidence that was uncovered from
13

the defendant should have been suppressed.

The trial court

erred in denying the defendant's Motion to Suppress.

DATED this

13

day of _

, 1995.
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1995, by first-class, U.S. Mail, postage

prepaid to the following:
Jan Graham
Attorney General
Attorney for Appellee
236 North State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
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Ruling from Court denying defendant's motion to suppress.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 941400228

v.

DATE: July 18, 1994
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS

STACEY COVINGTON,
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, filed
May 4, 1994. A hearing on this motion was held June 22, 1994. The Court, after carefully
considering the memoranda of counsel, entertaining argument of counsel, and having been
advised of the facts and law pertaining to this case, now enters the following:

I.
FACTS
On February 22, 1994, officers of the Pleasant Grove police department arrested
Rachel Anderson pursuant to warrant. When officers discovered methamphetamine on her
person, Anderson said that she had stolen the drug from one Rick Close and that there was
more of the drug at Mr. Close's residence. Officers knew of Mr. Close, having investigated
and arrested him a number of times in the recent past. Moreover, Mr. Close's basement
apartment was near the offices occupied at that time by the Narcotics Task Force (NET).
Indeed, officers had observed the entrance to Mr. Close's apartment from their office window.
Based upon Anderson's information, along with other information including their
personal knowledge of Close, officers obtained a search warrant from the Honorable John C.
Backlund of the Fourth Circuit Court. The warrant authorized "search of . . . [t]he downstairs

apartment and the persons of all individuals present at 479 South 100 East . . . for the
presence of Rick Close, John Walker and Melissa Seamster" (Co-defendants in this case) and
drug-related evidence.

Moreover, the warrant describes the building as Ma white frame

building containing two apartments."

The description of the apartment was based upon the

officers1 personal acquaintance with the premises.

However, the correct address of the

building is 475. South 100 East and the building is white on three sides but blue on the side
facing the street.
At the time this search warrant was issued, there were active warrants for the arrest of
the three named individuals. As stated in the supporting affidavit, officers believed that all
three were then living in the apartment—a fact later confirmed during the execution of the
warrant. Moreover, to prevent the destruction, loss or sale of the drug-related evidence
believed to be in Close's apartment, officers applied for and obtained authorization for
nighttime, no-knock entry, pursuant to U.C.A. 77-23-5(1).
Pleasant Grove uniformed officers and NET officers executed the warrant at 8:40 p.m.
on February 22, 1994. As they approached the only entrance to the apartment, on the east
side of the building, officers observed Defendant Stacey Covington standing just outside the
apartment door. Near the Defendant to the east was the front end of a pickup truck with its
hood raised. NET officers recognized Defendant as a person associated with Rick Close and
the others named in the warrant. Some of the officers approached the Defendant, restrained
him, and conducted a frisk or Mpat down" search of his person. This pat down search resulted
in the discovery of both a marijuana pipe and marijuana.
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Following this discovery, officers brought Defendant into jhe apartment and secured
him along with the other Co-defendants, while they awaited transportation to the Pleasant
Grove Police Department. Officers then found a small canister on the ground near the spot
where the Defendant had been restrained. The canister proved to contain 7.3 grams of
methamphetamine, a controlled substance. Officers also found a second container in the
engine compartment of the truck, which appeared to have been thrown or tossed there.
Within the container was a white powder non-controlled substance which officers believe to
have been intended for mixture with the methamphetamine prior to sale.
As with all arrestees, Defendant was searched again at the police department, at which
time they found a small quantity of methamphetamine on the Defendant's person. Defendant
was subsequently charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute
in a Drug Free Zone (a First Degree Felony), Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance in
a Drug Free Zone (a Class A Misdemeanor), Illegal Drug Tax (a Third Degree Felony), and
(Unlawful Possession or Use of Drug Paraphernalia in a Drug Free Zone (a Class A
Misdemeanor).

n.
ISSUES PRESENTED
A.

Whether certain errors in the address and description of the premises to be searched
render warrant defective when officers were neither mistaken nor confused as to the
location described.

B.

Whether Defendant, who was searched while standing just outside the only door to
apartment, fell within the scope of warrant authorizing search of "apartment and the
person of all individuals present."

3

C.

Whether affidavit and request for search warrant gave reasonable cause to support
issuance of warrant authorizing nighttime search under U.C.A. 77-23-5(1).

III.
ANALYSIS

A. Description of the Premises
The Defendant seeks to invalidate the search warrant based on inaccuracies in its
identification and description of the targeted premises. The Court considers this an impotent
ploy on the facts of this case.

It is well-established that the purpose of the description of the

premises is to enable the officers executing the warrant to locate the premises. Thus M[t]he
description is sufficient if the officer executing the search warrant can with reasonable effort
ascertain and identify the place to be searched." State v. Mclntire, 768 P.2d 970 at 972 (Utah
App. 1989) citing State v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099 at 1102-03 (Utah, 1985).
In this case, NET officers were personally familiar with the residence, having observed
Close, one of its residents, for some time. Moreover, affiant Officer Michael Blackhurst, and
other NET officers were all present and participated in the execution of the warrant. None of
the officers went to a wrong location. Neither did the officers rely upon address numbers to
determine the correct house: the numbers did not appear anywhere on the building.
Defendant does not dispute that the accurate parts of the description, coupled with the
officers* actual acquaintance with the premises, neither left confusion as to the location of the
premises nor resulted in a search of the wrong premises. The three persons named in the
warrant were all in the apartment and were all arrested pursuant to warrant. The errors in
description of the premises amount to nothing of legal consequence.
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B. Scope of the Warrant
The warrant in this case authorized the search of the "apartment and the person of all
individuals present." Defendant argues that because he was standing outside, he was not
"present" at the apartment at the time he was spotted and searched. However, "it has been
generally held that a search warrant describing only the residence will authorize a search of
any buildings or vehicles within the 'curtilage' even though they are not specifically described
in the warrant," State v. Basturo. 807 P.2d 162 (Kan. App. 1991, afTd. 821 P. 2d 327 (Kan.
1991), see also United States v. Gottschalk, 915 F.2d 1459 (10th Cir., 1990) (authorized
search of premises included search of car inside curtilage). Accordingly, the issue here is
whether, at the time of search, Defendant was within the curtilage of the premises.
The curtilage of a home is "usually defined as a small piece of land, not necessarily
enclosed, around a dwelling house and generally includes buildings used for domestic
purposes in the conduct of family affairs." (State v. Kender. 588 P.2d 447 at 449 (Haw.
1979) (emphasis added)). A number of factors, as enumerated by the United States Supreme
Court, should be considered in reaching a determination of the extent of the curtilage in any
given case. These factors include (1) the proximity of the area to the home; (2) whether the
area has been fenced or enclosed; (3) the nature and uses of the area; and (4) what steps have
been taken to protect the area from observation. United States v. Dunn. 480 U.S. 294 (1977).
In this case, Defendant was located at the time of search immediately east of the only
entrance to the basement apartment. He was standing within ten feet of the house, between
the apartment door and a nearby truck with its hood raised. Both the Defendant and the truck
were well within a space that had the obvious appearance of a parking and yard area for
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residents of the apartments- The area is bounded by trees and debris to the north and a dirt
driveway to the south.
Defendant would characterize the area to the east of the house as a common area for
both the house mentioned in the warrant and the house immediately to the south. It is true
that the driveway flows into a large dirt parking area that is shared by Mr. Close's apartment
and the building or buildings to the south. (At the time of the arrest—February—the dirt was
snow-packed.) However, the spot where the Defendant was first discovered and searched was
so close to the back of the house and far enough away from the line of the driveway as to
leave no room for doubt that he was associated with the house. In effect, the Defendant was
"walled in" by the trees to the north, a driveway to the south, the truck with the raised hood
to the east, and the apartment to the west. This small area, adjacent to the apartment, clearly
fell within the curtilage.
The scope of the warrant authorized a search for drugs which might be found on the
person of anyone present, including the Defendant. Given Defendant's known association
with persons who lived at the residence, coupled with his proximity to the apartment door, he
was "present" at the apartment and consequently within the scope of the warrant.

C. Nighttime Search
Defendant relies on State v. Rowe (no citation given) to sustain the proposition that
the supporting affidavit here did not furnish "reasonable cause" for authorizing a nighttime
search. In Rowe. the court focused on U.C.A. 77-23-5(1), which states in pertinent part:

The magistrate must insert a direction in the warrant that it be served in the
daytime, unless the affidavits or oral testimony state a reasonable cause to
6

believe a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it being
concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, or for other good reason; in which
case he may insert a direction that it be served any time of the day or night.

There are two reported decisions in the Rowe case. In State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730
(Utah App. 1991) (Rowe I herein), the Court of Appeals held invalid a nighttime search
warrant supported by an affidavit containing only the pre-printed statutory language quoted
above. The warrant was devoid of elaboration of any reasonable basis for its conclusion. In
State v. Rowe. 850 P.2d 427 (Utah, 1992) fRowe II herein), the Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals. Rowe II did not disturb the decision that the bare conclusion in the
affidavit, without elaboration or basis, could not support a nighttime search. It did, however,
rule that nighttime search under such a warrant was not a fundamental violation of the
Defendant's rights which would require suppression of the evidence. The Court observed:
Where the alleged violation . . . is not 'fundamental1 suppression [sic] is
required only where (1) there was 'prejudice1 in the sense that the search might
not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the [r]ule had been
followed, or (2) there is evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a
provision of the [r]ule. . . . It is only where the violation also implicates
fundamental, constitutional concerns, is conducted in bad faith or has
substantially prejudiced the defendant that exclusion may be an appropriate
remedy. Rowe II at 429.

The nighttime search warrant in the instant case is clearly appropriate under Rowe I.
In any event, no allegation has been made which would justify the exclusion of any evidence
under Rowe II. After establishing throughout his supporting affidavit that persons on the
premises were likely in possession of and selling controlled substances, Officer Blackhurst,
stated his experience concerning persons who sell small quantities of methamphetamine.
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"Such persons will typically sell what they have as quickly as they can until they are out of
inventory . . .". (Paragraph 13.) Officer Blackhurst had previously qualified himself in the
affidavit as an expert on narcotics trafficking in the area. (Paragraph 1.) Moreover,
Paragraph 14 establishes that officers had acted in good faith, upon receipt of critical evidence
mentioned in the affidavit, to prepare and obtain a search warrant but that execution likely
would be impossible before dark. His conclusion that evidence would be lost or destroyed if
search were delayed rested upon reliable information indicating that small quantities of
methamphetamine were being distributed at the apartment, (paragraphs 4, 8, and 12), coupled
with his experience that small quantities would be sold as quickly as possible. This hardly
resembles the recitation of statutory factors in a check-off form of the type proscribed by
Rowe I
But in any event, there is no evidence, indeed no allegation, that but for the nighttime
authorization this search would not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive. There
is no evidence of an intentional and deliberate disregard of the statute. On the contrary, there
is evidence of a good faith attempt to balance the statutory concern for nighttime searches
with the need promptly to obtain the suspected contraband and arrest the individuals known to
be in the apartment. Hence, there is no basis for the application of Rowe FT to the instant
case. There is, in sum, no reason to suppress the evidence.

IV. CONCLUSION
The search of the Defendant pursuant to a warrant which misstated the address of the
premises to be searched and inaccurately described it as a white frame house was lawful,
inasmuch as officers were not misled as to the correct location of the search. Moreover, the
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Defendant's presence within the curtilage of the apartment connected him with the apartment
so as to be "present" at the apartment and thus within the scope of a warrant authorizing a
search of the apartment and the person of all individuals present. Finally, the affidavit in
support of the warrant stated reasonable cause for the execution of a nighttime search and, in
any event, Defendant's constitutional rights have not been violated as a result of a purportedly
inadequate affidavit.

V. RULING
Defendant's motion to suppress evidence is denied.

Dated at Provo, Utah, this

day of

#HW

. 1994

BY THE COURT

.Wage Lynn W. Davis
cc:

James R. Taylor
Shelden R. Carter

